We’re going to keep the pattern going and attack another free Sherlock from HackTheBox called Origins. This is rated “Very Easy” and just consists of a .zip file download containing a .pcap file. As is customary, the password to extract the files is hacktheblue.

Here’s our scenario for this adventure:
A major incident has recently occurred at Forela. Approximately 20 GB of data were stolen from internal s3 buckets and the attackers are now extorting Forela. During the root cause analysis, an FTP server was suspected to be the source of the attack. It was found that this server was also compromised and some data was stolen, leading to further compromises throughout the environment. You are provided with a minimal PCAP file. Your goal is to find evidence of brute force and data exfiltration.

Since our only evidence is in a .pcap file, we’ll have to fire up Wireshark (or your network traffic analyzer of choice).

Task 1: What is the attacker’s IP address?

Looking in the ftp.pcap file, we have multiple protocols represented. Since we know that the ultimate compromise came from FTP, let’s start by filtering traffic that is using the FTP protocol. Adding this as a filter will do the trick: _ws.col.protocol == “FTP”. That gets us down to 163 packets out of the 547 in the file. We can see over and over again that the main source making the requests is 15.206.185.207. If you look, the first few entries have a source of 172.31.45.144, but that is responding. The one making the request for the admin user is 15.206.185.207. Then 172.31.45.144 asks for the password. This makes it definitive which side is which.

Task 1 Answer: 15.206.185.207

Task 2: It’s critical to get more knowledge about the attackers, even if it’s low fidelity. Using the geolocation data of the IP address used by the attackers, what city do they belong to?

You can go to many different places for this. I’m getting this lookup from this site. Just search the IP and get the city.

Task 2 Answer: Mumbai

Task 3: Which FTP application was used by the backup server? Enter the full name and version. (Format: Name Version)

Take a look back at the filtered capture from Task 1. You can see what the server (172.31.45.144) is responding.

Task 3 Answer: vsFTPd 3.0.5

Task 4: The attacker has started a brute force attack on the server. When did this attack start?

Let’s do an additional filter for only traffic with this IP as the source within the FTP traffic. We can definitely see a brute force attempt happening. If we click the first one (packet 100), it will show details in the bottom left pane. If we expand the Frame 100 section, we can see Arrival Time, UTC Arrival Time, and Epoch Arrival time. The format for the HTB answer wanted one of the two “normal” dates (and not the epoch time). I guessed they wanted UTC as my first shot as that is pretty standard, and that was it.

Task 4 Answer: 2024-05-03 04:12:54

Task 5: What are the correct credentials that gave the attacker access? (Format username:password)

For this one, I just scrolled down to the end of the attack. I figured the attack would stop when he was successful. When I got to the last row that had PASS in it (number 407). I then right clicked on it and chose Follow -> TCP Stream Ctrl+Alt+Shift+T. That brings up the entire “conversation” in a window and also adds a filter tcp.stream eq 33 so that you now can see all of the individual pieces that make up what has been assembled for us. But from here, we can see what worked.

220 (vsFTPd 3.0.5)

USER forela-ftp

331 Please specify the password.

PASS ftprocks69$

230 Login successful.

SYST

215 UNIX Type: L8

FEAT

211-Features:
 EPRT
 EPSV
 MDTM
 PASV
 REST STREAM
 SIZE
 TVFS
211 End

EPSV

229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||63192|)

LIST

150 Here comes the directory listing.
226 Directory send OK.

EPSV

229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||40790|)

NLST

150 Here comes the directory listing.
226 Directory send OK.

TYPE I

200 Switching to Binary mode.

SIZE Maintenance-Notice.pdf

213 27855

EPSV

229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||9759|)

RETR Maintenance-Notice.pdf

150 Opening BINARY mode data connection for Maintenance-Notice.pdf (27855 bytes).
226 Transfer complete.

MDTM Maintenance-Notice.pdf

213 20240503034329

SIZE s3_buckets.txt

213 268

EPSV

229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||23530|)

RETR s3_buckets.txt

150 Opening BINARY mode data connection for s3_buckets.txt (268 bytes).
226 Transfer complete.

MDTM s3_buckets.txt

213 20240503034852

EPSV

229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||15028|)

STOR /home/cyberjunkieX0X/HACKED.txt

550 Permission denied.

QUIT

221 Goodbye.

Task 5 Answer: forela-ftp:ftprocks69$

Task 6: The attacker has exfiltrated files from the server. What is the FTP command used to download the remote files?

Look at the command listing from Task 5. You can see it there.

Task 6 Answer: RETR

Task 7: Attackers were able to compromise the credentials of a backup SSH server. What is the password for this SSH server?

Looking at the conversation in Task 5, I don’t see any passwords directly compromised during that interaction. My guess is that they were in some of the files. Let’s take a look at the files that were downloaded. We can see that it looks like the attacker got a file called Maintenance-Notice.pdf and one called s3_buckets.txt. Let’s just go up to the File Menu and select Export Objects -> FTP-DATA. We can then choose Save All and put those files in the directory of our choosing.

s3_buckets.txt just contains this

https://2023-coldstorage.s3.amazonaws.com # bulk data from 2023, if required anything from here contact simon or alonzo. Retention period is 4 years
https://2022-warmstor.s3.amazonaws.com # pending audit, email alonzo at archivebackups@forela.co.uk for any clearance

Maintenance-Notice.pdf has a lot of information, but contains this juicy paragraph:

For team members requiring urgent access to the backup SSH servers during the maintenance
period, you can use the temporary password "**B@ckup2024!**" - kindly ensure this information is
handled securely and do not share it outside of our team.

Task 7 Answer: **B@ckup2024!**

Task 8: What is the s3 bucket URL for the data archive from 2023?

Just check up in the contents of s3_buckets.txt.

Task 8 Answer: https://2023-coldstorage.s3.amazonaws.com

Task 9: The scope of the incident is huge as Forela’s s3 buckets were also compromised and several GB of data were stolen and leaked. It was also discovered that the attackers used social engineering to gain access to sensitive data and extort it. What is the internal email address used by the attacker in the phishing email to gain access to sensitive data stored on s3 buckets?

This is also in the s3_buckets.txt file.

Task 9 Answer: archivebackups@forela.co.uk

And there we go. That was a fun little exploration of some of the things that Wireshark can do for us.

Today I’m going to be doing another free Sherlock from Hack the Box called Electric Breeze 1. As you might remember from my last post, Sherlocks are what Hack the Box calls their investigative Capture the Flags (because you’re investigating like Sherlock Holmes, get it?!?).

The scenario says this:
Your security team must always be up-to-date and aware of the threats targeting organizations in your industry. As you begin your journey as a Threat Intelligence Intern, equipped with some SOC experience, your manager has assigned you a task to test your research skills and how effectively you can leverage the MITRE ATT&CK framework. * Conduct thorough research on Volt Typhoon. * Use the MITRE ATT&CK framework to map adversary behavior and tactics into actionable insights. Impress your manager with your assessment, showcasing your passion for threat intelligence.

Unlike the last one, that means that there is nothing to download or start with. We’re just going to do some research and become more familiar and acquainted with some of the Blue Team research tools that are out there.

Task 1: Based on MITRE’s sources, since when has Volt Typhoon been active?

First, we need to look up Volt Typhoon on the MITRE page. Googling MITRE Volt Typoon brought me to this page as my first result. The answer is right in the first paragraph at the top.

Volt Typhoon is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored actor that has been active since at least 2021 primarily targeting critical infrastructure organizations in the US and its territories including Guam

Task 1 Answer: 2021

Task 2: MITRE identifies two OS credential dumping techniques used by Volt Typhoon. One is LSASS Memory access (T1003.001). What is the Attack ID for the other technique?

I did a CTRL-F and searched for T1003 to find that part of the page. That brought me right to the two OS Credential Dumping techniques and we can see what the other one is.

Task 2 Answer: T1003.003

Task 3: Which database is targeted by the credential dumping technique mentioned earlier?

If we look at that image again, we can see that they “used ntds.util to create domain controller installation media containing usernames and password hashes“. If you didn’t know what NTDS is, here’s a good succinct definition from Semperis.com, “NTDS.DIT, which stands for the New Technology Directory Services Directory Information Tree, is the database for Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS).” Given the number of characters in the textbox on HTB, we know the answer.

Task 3 Answer: Active Directory

Task 4: Which registry hive is required by the threat actor to decrypt the targeted database?

This one I just knew the hives usually used if you’re attacking a Windows Machine and trying to crack passwords. But if you scroll up the page and find other places that the ntds.dit was referenced, you find this quote. The number of characters tell you which one they are looking for.

Volt Typhoon has saved stolen files including the ntds.dit database and the SYSTEM and SECURITY Registry hives locally to the C:\Windows\Temp\ directory.

Task 4 Answer: SYSTEM

Task 5: During the June 2024 campaign, an adversary was observed using a Zero-Day Exploitation targeting Versa Director. What is the name of the Software/Malware that was used?

If we do a CTRL-F for 2024, we find this referencing the June 2024 attack on Versa Director.

If we click that hyperlink for C0039 and read, we find this “Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation involved the development of a new web shell variant, VersaMem.”

Task 5 Answer: VersaMem

Task 6: According to the Server Software Component, what type of malware was observed?

Scroll down a little bit under Techniques Used and we find “Server Software Component: Web Shell”

Task 6 Answer: Web Shell

Task 7: Where did the malware store captured credentials?

Click the link for VersaMem from that page. Under Techniques Used, we says “VersaMem staged captured credentials locally at /tmp/.temp.data.”

Task 7 Answer: /tmp/.temp.data

Task 8: According to MITRE’s reference, a Lumen/Black Lotus Labs article(Taking The Crossroads: The Versa Director Zero-Day Exploitation.), what was the filename of the first malware version scanned on VirusTotal?

Scroll to the bottom of that VersaMem page under the References section and click the link they describe. You find this early in the article, “The VersaMem web shell is a sophisticated JAR web shell that was uploaded to VirusTotal on June 7, 2024, with the filename “VersaTest.png” and currently has zero anti-virus (AV) detections.”

Task 8 Answer: VersaTest.png

Task 9: What is the SHA256 hash of the file?

Scroll down a bit in the article. They show an image of it from VirusTotal with the hash below it.

Task 9 Answer: 4bcedac20a75e8f8833f4725adfc87577c32990c3783bf6c743f14599a176c37

Task 10: According to VirusTotal, what is the file type of the malware?

We can just go to VirusTotal and search that hash now that we have it and we get here. The answer is right at the top (and also in the quote back in Task 8).

Task 10 Answer: jar

Task 11: What is the ‘Created by’ value in the file’s Manifest according to VirusTotal?

Click the Details tab and scroll down to the Manifest section

Manifest-Version: 1.0
Archiver-Version: Plexus Archiver
Created-By: Apache Maven 3.6.0
Built-By: versa
Build-Jdk: 11.0.19
Agent-Class: com.versa.vnms.ui.TestMain
Can-Redefine-Classes: true
Can-Retransform-Classes: true
Main-Class: com.versa.vnms.ui.TestMain
Premain-Class: com.versa.vnms.ui.TestMain

Task 11 Answer: Apache Maven 3.6.0

Task 12: What is the CVE identifier associated with this malware and vulnerability?

Go back to the detection tab on Virus total and under the DrWeb analysis, it calls it Exploit.CVE-2024-39717.1. That gives you the Exploit in the middle there.

Task 12 Answer: CVE-2024-39717

Task 13: According to the CISA document(https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-03/aa24-038a_csa_prc_state_sponsored_actors_compromise_us_critical_infrastructure_3.pdf) referenced by MITRE, what is the primary strategy Volt Typhoon uses for defense evasion?

Go read that link. Under the section titled “Defense Evasion”, it says “Volt Typhoon has strong operational security. Their actors primarily use LOTL for defense evasion, which allows them to camouflage their malicious activity with typical system and network behavior, potentially circumventing simplistic endpoint security capabilities.” (Note: LOTL means “Living of the Land”, meaning that the attackers use tools that are already on the system or network instead of installing additional tools from outside the machine/network.)

Task 13 Answer: LOTL

Task 14: In the CISA document, which file name is associated with the command potentially used to analyze logon patterns by Volt Typhoon?

To the document again, “Specifically, in one incident, analysis of the PowerShell console history of a domain
controller indicated that security event logs were directed to a file named user.dat, as evidenced by the executed command Get-EventLog security -instanceid 4624 -after [year-month-date] | fl * | Out-File ‘C:\users\public\documents\user.dat’.”

Task 14 Answer: C:\users\public\documents\user.dat

Thats it. A lot of questions/tasks on this one and we just had to do a little research across MITRE, VirusTotal, and a few articles. This really highlights one of the largest, most important tasks if you’re on the Blue Team – research. You have to know about threats and threat actors and stay up to date. Then, you need to understand the things that we researched here so you can tune your rules to be able to identify if these attacks or attackers are targeting you.

Our capture the flag walkthrough today is found over on Hack the Box (HTB). Instead of the offensive security walkthroughs that I’ve been doing, this one is more focused on defensive investigative skills. These classifications for these rooms at HTB are called “Sherlocks” and today’s room is a retired free one called Dream Job-1. It focuses on researching a specific attack campaign, the attackers, and their tactics. Let’s get started.

The first thing we have to do is download the attached zip file called DreamJob1.zip. They give you the password to extract it as hacktheblue. Inside the zip is one file named IOCs.txt containing 3 lines of text. For now, we won’t need this file until Question 10.

Task 1: Who Conducted Operation Dream Job?

So unlike TryHackMe, Hack the Box doesn’t really teach you how to do things. You either have to know how, have worked through some of their training elsewhere, have access to walkthroughs, or be good at searching. In this case, we’re going to go to the MITRE ATT&CK® homepage at https://attack.mitre.org/. Click on CTI then Campaigns.

Scroll down until you get to C0022 Operation Dream Job or Ctrl-F and search for Operation Dream Job on the page.

Task 1 Answer: Lazarus Group

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Task 2: When was this operation first observed?

Click the name or ID of the campaign and it takes you here: https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0022/. You can see in the Info Box on the right some quick info about this campaign, including when it was First Seen.

Task 2 Answer: September 2019

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Task 3: There are 2 campaigns associated with Operation Dream Job. One is Operation North Star, what is the other?

Using the same image, we can see the Associated Campaigns.

Task 3 Answer: Operation Interception

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Task 4: During Operation Dream Job, there were the two system binaries used for proxy execution. One was Regsvr32, what was the other?

Scroll down or search for Binary Proxy Execution. You can see the two mentioned, the answer is the other one.

Task 4 Answer: Rundll32

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Task 5: What lateral movement technique did the adversary use?

On the page, near the top, you can click into the ATT&CK® Navigator Layers dropdown and View.

After you get to the layers, horizontally scroll right until you see Lateral Movement. Click the header to have the column highlighted (can be a bit cramped and this helps to see).

Task 5 Answer: Internal Spearphishing

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Task 6: What is the technique ID for the previous answer?
Hover/Click on that highlighted part and read the kick out.

Task 6 Answer: T1534

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Task 7: What Remote Access Trojan did the Lazarus Group use in Operation Dream Job?

Go back to the Operation Dream Job Campaign Page. Scroll down to Software.

Task 7 Answer: DRATzarus

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Task 8: What technique did the malware use for execution?

Click the Software Link for DRATzarus and go to https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0694/

Use the Navigator Layers dropdown like we did before and load up its Enterprise Layer and go to Execution. Native API is highlighted.

Task 8 Answer: Native API

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Task 9: What technique did the malware use to avoid detection in a sandbox?

On the same page, under Discovery, there is a box called Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion. Its child box has the answer.

Task 9 Answer: Time Based Evasion

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Task 10: To answer the remaining questions, utilize VirusTotal and refer to the IOCs.txt file. What is the name associated with the first hash provided in the IOC file?

Looking in the file, the first hash is 7bb93be636b332d0a142ff11aedb5bf0ff56deabba3aa02520c85bd99258406f

If we go to VirusTotal and put in that hash, it takes us here

After you search, it takes you to the page and the answer is right in the header.

Task 10 Answer: IEXPLORE.EXE

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Task 11: When was the file associated with the second hash in the IOC first created?

Second hash from the file is adce894e3ce69c9822da57196707c7a15acee11319ccc963b84d83c23c3ea802. If we search it, it takes us here.

Details -> History -> Creation Time

Task 11 Answer: 2020-05-12 19:26:17

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Task 12: What is the name of the parent execution file associated with the second hash in the IOC?

Same page, Relations -> Execution Parents

Task 12 Answer: BAE_HPC_SE.iso

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Task 13: Examine the third hash provided. What is the file name likely used in the campaign that aligns with the adversary’s known tactics?

Third hash from the file is 0160375e19e606d06f672be6e43f70fa70093d2a30031affd2929a5c446d07c1. If we search it, it takes us here.

Go to Details -> Names

Remember that according to the task, the victims of this were job seekers and that they used “fake job lures”, so…

Task 13 Answer: Salary_Lockheed_Martin_job_opportunities_confidential.doc

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Task 14: Which URL was contacted on 2022-08-03 by the file associated with the third hash in the IOC file?

Relations -> Contacted URLs, look for Scanned = 2022-08-03

Task 14 Answer: https://markettrendingcenter.com/lk_job_oppor.docx

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That’s it. I hope you enjoyed this little Blue Team exercise in researching some details of an attack from some artifacts!